THE world’s financial sector is in the grip of a crisis. The Lehman Brothers fiasco is expected to be seismic in its impact and could well reshape banking, insurance and allied services. Senator John McCain blames Wall Street greed for the disaster, while Barack Obama attributes the quake to the mindless “hands-off” approach of the George W. Bush administration.
Obviously, politics has been injected fully into what should have been a dispassionate, professional analysis of a grave situation. I cannot help but draw a parallel to the debate on terrorism in India. The Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party are engaged in a blame game that will not take us anywhere near a solution, if at all a solution to the growing menace is possible.
The Delhi blasts of September 13 came, ironically, two days after the seventh anniversary of 9/11. I am surprised the miscreants responsible did not act two days earlier and gain greater mileage internationally. Possibly, they did not want Al Qaeda to take credit for the (mis)adventure. This squares with expert assessment that Indian terrorism has come of age and requires no external assistance. It does not for a moment mean that the self-styled Indian Mujahideen and its suspected mentor, the Students Islamic Movement of India, do not draw their inspiration from Osama bin Laden. The spark comes from the latter and it ignites the minds of scores of misguided Muslim youth in the country.
The Mumbai blasts of 1993 and the Coimbatore explosions of 1998 highlighted the ferment within the Muslim community, for some right and more wrong reasons. Future historians could point to the Ayodhya issue as the watershed in Hindu-Muslim relations. But that would be too simplistic an analysis to explain these two gruesome happenings. Greater justification for terrorist strikes comes perhaps in the form of our holding on to Kashmir, our support to Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the nuclear deal with the United States.
The terrorist will look for more reasons each day to instigate the Muslim youth in the country and mislead them into believing that under the present set-up they have no future. If bombs planted in crowded public places incidentally kill many innocent Muslims, this does not matter so long as the action is in the cause of the jehad. I do not see a let-up in the violence for some time to come. This is why every rupee spent on protecting the public from savage strikes is worth it.
There are several aspects of the debate that could annoy the average citizen, especially one who has suffered directly at the hands of terrorists. It is preposterous to blame either the United Progressive Alliance or the National Democratic Alliance for the current mess. Both are equally culpable for having failed to produce a national consensus. Both have given strong grounds to believe that they carry, besides a genuine resolve to defeat terrorism, a desire to make political gains. This is what has reduced their credibility when they talk of tackling terrorism with an iron hand.
When we watch the Obama-McCain debate in the U.S., there may be some comfort that the Indian politician is not alone in the game of politicising even crucial issues impinging on national security. But this is cheap comfort. We must resolve to make our leaders understand that our patience is wearing thin, and we expect them to abandon all narrow pursuits.
Is this not the time for us to call for a national government that would sink all political differences and address squarely the issue of terrorism to ensure that it is handled in a tough and professional manner? If next year’s elections are put off, say by a year, while a non-partisan government engages in the task of combating terrorism, it would do all of us a world of good. This is a major move, which can only come about under great public pressure.
It is a strategy that may or may not work. It is nevertheless worth a try. I can assure you that the average citizen is fed up with the current mess. The people’s interest lies in protecting their own lives and property, and a general election is not what the country needs at this crucial juncture when the very basis of constitutional government is under question by some within the country who receive active support from across the border.
Federal agency
The Delhi blasts prove yet again that the way our law enforcement agencies are organised does not answer the need of the hour. I was one of those strongly opposed to the creation of an agency outside the Central Bureau of Investigation for investigating terrorism. Since taking that stand years ago, the magnitude of the problem has enlarged beyond belief. We cannot lose any more time in setting up a federal agency – call it by any name – that would have the authority to take cognisance of any terrorist incident in any part of the country.
The States will have to accede to this. No Chief Minister who opposes such a move has the moral right to criticise the Centre for being soft on terrorism. The mere fear that such an agency will become politicised in the course of time is no grounds for opposing its creation. After all, there is a strong judiciary, which would come down heavily on blatant political use of the new outfit. Let us not dither on creating the new organisation.
Then, there is the row over a new terror law. This subject has invited acrimony in the past. The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA), 1987, and the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), 2002, invite derision instead of fear and respect. Neither law was bad in itself. The way each of them was perceived by the politician or implemented by a government of the time hardly enhanced its acceptability. Let us forget the past. Let us devise a new law in quick time – the Administrative Reforms Commission headed by Veerappa Moily has endorsed this – and place it on the statute books. Let us not quibble and say that the existing law is adequate because it has drawn liberally from both TADA and POTA.
This, again, calls for unprecedented political consensus. If we do not forge such unity now when we have nearly lost the war against terrorism, we can never do so. A stringent law may have negative human rights implications. This is again no grounds for postponing action. An intelligent country devises ways and means to check abuses rather than not act at all to produce a much needed piece of legislation. Saying, as some in the government now do, that the existing law is strong enough is to adopt the attitude of an ostrich. The U.S. and the United Kingdom have benefited from new laws. Neither has suffered a major attack since 9/11 and 7/7 respectively. Is this not enough to goad us into acting?
Coming down to brass tacks, how are we going to protect public places that attract huge crowds, such as markets (the principal targets in both the 2005 and 2008 attacks in Delhi), railway stations, places of worship and cinema houses? Minister for Science and Technology Kapil Sibal spoke sometime ago about experiments relating to sensors that could help detect explosives. What is the progress? Inexpensive devices capable of being produced on a large scale are the need of the hour. They should be part of the drill to ensure public safety.
Introducing closed circuit television (CCTV) in large numbers at places where crowds gather every day can act as a deterrent. Here again, economically manufactured devices can play a major role. Many Western cities, especially London, have a positive experience. Why can we not adopt a similar tactic? Going by the ease with which we have implemented the Sixth Pay Commission recommendations, the country can afford the expenditure.
It would be a fatal mistake to dismiss suggestions for widespread use of sensors and cameras in public places as wasteful or impractical. Banking solely on the resilience of our citizens, who come back to normal after every attack, is unethical. You ask the surviving victims or the families of those killed in recent incidents, you will get an entirely different picture.
The community’s role in organising the nation against terrorism remains diffused. Except for the odd debate on television, that too only for a few days after an incident, I do not see any strong evidence of a resolve to assist law enforcement by way of information on suspicious goings-on in certain urban centres. Without such inputs, no intelligence agency will ever prove effective. As I have said earlier, fighting terrorism should become a national obsession. It is for the media to help keep the focus.
Monday, October 6, 2008
Wednesday, October 1, 2008
hostel life
It was admission time and the college campuses were bustling with activity. New faces with twinkle in their eye can be seen briskly walking to their respective departments to enquire about various formalities that are required to be completed. It's a new beginning for the most crucial phase of their life .
While a majority wear the excited look, others seem to sulk a bit. The sulking community comprises mainly of the hostellers for whom the thought of staying away from home seem to bug.
But they are quite unaware that this could be the most exciting and chilling period of life.
"The last four years of college had been the best years in my life. And I know that I will never get that opportunity again. Hostel life comes once in a way in lifetime and one should never miss it.
It is true that hostellers will be missing mothers delicious food early in the morning and papa's assuring pat in the night but there is something more that one would cherish all his or her life.
Most of the first time hostelers tend to become homesick in the initial weeks. But the real life starts only after that. "In the early days many factors play in the back of the mind like home food, new place, new faces, fear of being ragged by seniors and the thought of staying away from near and dear ones.
All the factors vanish once they get over the fear of ragging by seniors and the seniors become their best friends. It happened to me and my roommates. Initially we all faced similar kinds of problem but after that we were least interested in going home, even during the semester breaks. Hostel is home away from home for us.(haddi,arun.me,joshi and chowda cant forget 5th semester break)
Fun and learning
Hostel life is not only fun but also a place to learn. Here one comes across people from various backgrounds and culture.(punjabi puttar mohit , GD, singla and inder ; lalaji ,nilesh and goppu from bihar; joshi from ujjain ; dolphin from delhi and many more)
Most hostellers claim that it is the best place to forge bonds of friendship. "Here, we not only take care of each other but also learn things from one and another. It is the perfect setting for group study and cultural interaction.
This is the place where our latent creative juices come to the fore. Many projects take its shape here in the hostels. Burning the midnight oil before semesters and projects is a common phenomenon in hostels.
Keeping aside the learning, fun is in abundance in the hostels. To get the most out of it one has to learn to get well with the mates.
Apart from gully cricket in the hostel compound and floodlit badminton in the courtyard and football in our field with computer friends like (samridh,birla,pegu and pulkit), life in the hostels is full of fun and frolic. "Most of us lead a restricted life at home. At the hostels we find a newfound freedom. Late night movies specially (gunda at shedis room), picnics and nightlong gossip become part of our life( how can we forget the GC between tashan,shedi,saquib ,lalaji and sinha ). But all the fun is not at the cost of studies.
Hostel life could be great sans the stray incidents of ragging and unpleasant experiences. And one should look forward towards it eagerly rather than sulk and get into the trap of homesick syndrome.
While a majority wear the excited look, others seem to sulk a bit. The sulking community comprises mainly of the hostellers for whom the thought of staying away from home seem to bug.
But they are quite unaware that this could be the most exciting and chilling period of life.
"The last four years of college had been the best years in my life. And I know that I will never get that opportunity again. Hostel life comes once in a way in lifetime and one should never miss it.
It is true that hostellers will be missing mothers delicious food early in the morning and papa's assuring pat in the night but there is something more that one would cherish all his or her life.
Most of the first time hostelers tend to become homesick in the initial weeks. But the real life starts only after that. "In the early days many factors play in the back of the mind like home food, new place, new faces, fear of being ragged by seniors and the thought of staying away from near and dear ones.
All the factors vanish once they get over the fear of ragging by seniors and the seniors become their best friends. It happened to me and my roommates. Initially we all faced similar kinds of problem but after that we were least interested in going home, even during the semester breaks. Hostel is home away from home for us.(haddi,arun.me,joshi and chowda cant forget 5th semester break)
Fun and learning
Hostel life is not only fun but also a place to learn. Here one comes across people from various backgrounds and culture.(punjabi puttar mohit , GD, singla and inder ; lalaji ,nilesh and goppu from bihar; joshi from ujjain ; dolphin from delhi and many more)
Most hostellers claim that it is the best place to forge bonds of friendship. "Here, we not only take care of each other but also learn things from one and another. It is the perfect setting for group study and cultural interaction.
This is the place where our latent creative juices come to the fore. Many projects take its shape here in the hostels. Burning the midnight oil before semesters and projects is a common phenomenon in hostels.
Keeping aside the learning, fun is in abundance in the hostels. To get the most out of it one has to learn to get well with the mates.
Apart from gully cricket in the hostel compound and floodlit badminton in the courtyard and football in our field with computer friends like (samridh,birla,pegu and pulkit), life in the hostels is full of fun and frolic. "Most of us lead a restricted life at home. At the hostels we find a newfound freedom. Late night movies specially (gunda at shedis room), picnics and nightlong gossip become part of our life( how can we forget the GC between tashan,shedi,saquib ,lalaji and sinha ). But all the fun is not at the cost of studies.
Hostel life could be great sans the stray incidents of ragging and unpleasant experiences. And one should look forward towards it eagerly rather than sulk and get into the trap of homesick syndrome.
yey another black saturday
Terror returned to haunt Delhi exactly two weeks after the serial blasts of Saturday, September the 13th, when news of an explosion in the crowded Mehrauli market, near historic Qutub Minar, set the city on edge.
According to eyewitness accounts, two men on a motorcycle dropped a black polythene bag opposite an electronic shop around 2:15 PM in the crowded market street in Ward No 8 of Mehrauli that is popularly known as the Sarai, barely 10 metres from the Jahaj Mahal where the annual "phoolwalon ki sair" procession, equally beloved to both Hindus and Muslims, culminates.
It is not clear whether the bag accidentally fell down or was purposely dropped by the pillion rider. But this much is clear that a 13-year-old boy, Santosh Kumar, picked it up to give it back to the bikers.
They refused, but Santosh was still keen on handing it to them when the packet exploded, killing him instantaneously and injuring 18 others. The last words heard by eyewitnesses and his relations were Kumar saying, "bhai saab, aapka packet gir gaya hai (brother, your packet has fallen)"
"Everything happened so suddenly. Thick smoke came out instantly and there was a bang. My nephew was in blood," recounts Santosh's maternal uncle Fantoosh, who has a small stall selling omelets and boiled eggs nearby. Santosh was out on an errand for him to get a crate of eggs.
The bikers, estimated to be around 30-32 years old, fled off on their Black Bajaj Pulsar with Delhi registration number. They were both wearing helmets and wearing black jeans and black T-shirts.
Three persons, including a couple, saw the entire episode and are being questioned.
The blast was so strong that it shattered the window panes of many of the houses nearby and formed a small 4 to 5 inch deep crater formed at the site of the blast. There were as many 23 who received serious injuries, and the doctors fear for at least three of the critically injured.
Police Delays & Lapses
Local residents were very upset at the lax security in the area and that the police took so long to respond -- apparently, various calls on telephone number 100 did not elicit a prompt response with the person at the other end repeatedly asking where Ward No 8 in Mehrauli was.
"There was a huge sound. I came out of my shop and saw some people were injured and screaming for help," a shopkeeper said. "Police were nowhere to be seen till one hour after the incident. We took the injured to the hospital," another shopkeeper, who was injured in the incident, added.
In the absence of police or ambulances, the locals picked up the dead and the injured and rushed them to hospitals themselves. Fire engines, bomb-disposal squad, ambulances have been rushed to the area. The injured have been rushed to AIIMS trauma centre and Safdarjang hospital.
Because the police responded so late, there was clearly a delay in sounding an alert for the bikers, and there has not been any lead so far; considering that Mehrauli is located on the border with Haryana, chances of their having crossed the border cannot be ruled out.
Not only that, many residents pointed out that even when Delhi Police personnel finally arrived, they in all likelihood ended up destroying forensic evidence that could have helped in gathering information about the blast.
intelligence of india and terrorism
A diffuse but highly networked group of terrorists, driven by a dangerous cocktail of extremist ideology and a simmering sense of anguish and revenge, currently pose a serious threat to India's economic and social structure. The militants exploit gaping holes in India’s counter-terrorism architecture and strategy as well as the nation’s ambivalent policies toward religious minorities, particularly the 150-million strong but largely impoverished Muslim community.
What has complicated the Indian intelligence agencies’ task since the flowering of al-Qaeda and a global jihadist movement after 9/11 is the alacrity with which various terrorist groups and their support structures have reworked their strategy and operational methods to effectively dodge a series of worldwide bans. The most dramatic change in the Indian context has been the realignment of terrorist forces, with prominent groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)—proscribed by the United States and other countries, including Pakistan—stepping back to allow Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami (HuJI), an al-Qaeda ally with a pan-South Asian presence, to lead the terror campaign in India (Rediff.com, May 25, 2007).
Other changes have been noticed in the structure and modus operandi of India’s terrorist groups. The new recruits to the cause are local men: young, educated and without previous involvement in extremist activities. These men form the nucleus of groups throughout India who tap into the local criminal-hawala network of couriers and handlers to move money and explosives—often locally acquired—to carry out terrorist strikes [1]. The group carrying out the operation typically disengages and disappears after striking, leaving hardly any trace of its existence. Since the simultaneous explosions in Delhi in 2005, investigating agencies frequently encounter red herrings left by the terrorists to confuse the investigation and allow greater time to disband and escape.
Changing Circumstances
Two critical aspects in the growth of Indian terrorism are the mounting evidence pointing to the involvement of the HuJI in terror attacks and the alliance of this group with the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), a banned network of young Muslim activists who openly claim Osama bin Laden as their idol (The Hindu, April 3, 2007). For a long time India’s federal and state investigating agencies did not see the link as a serious development, continuing instead to rely on past experience by focusing on LeT and JeM activists.
One of the primary reasons for this poor assessment was the inability of the intelligence agencies and the whole cornucopia of coordinating agencies at state and federal levels to think beyond the entrenched “conventional wisdom” of analyzing terrorist groups through ideological prisms, thereby completely missing the possibility that these groups might work together for a common goal. This has happened not only in India but even in Pakistan, where one such coalition of terror groups called Brigade 313 was involved in assassination attempts on President Pervez Musharraf (Newsline, August 2004; Asia Times, July 14, 2004).
Equally restricting has been the reluctance, and even refusal, to share information among the intelligence and security agencies. Along with an inept information-sharing architecture at the national level, this reluctance has proved to be the most critical flaw in counter-terrorism intelligence operations (The Hindu, October 30, 2001). The problem came to the fore recently when police in the Karnataka state of southern India arrested one Riyazuddin Nasir on charges of vehicle theft. Nasir would have been let out on bail for these minor charges but for a single intelligence official in Delhi who decided to search the database for connections with terrorist activities. Nasir was found to be a HuJI operative and one of India's most wanted men (The Hindu, February 12).
Failure to Cooperate
It is not really difficult to see where the problem is—an intelligence structure which has yet to emerge from its debilitating colonial legacy and a complementary stranglehold of bureaucracy. The structure and operational philosophy of state police and intelligence units have not changed much since British days—they are mostly structured as agencies to protect law and order and spy on rivals rather than act as investigative and intelligence units. Criminal investigators are usually inserted into terrorism investigations only after an incident takes place. There are no independent anti-terror units carrying out both intelligence and investigations into terrorist groups at the state level.
At the top of the intelligence pyramid is the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), headed by an all-powerful, politically-appointed National Security Advisor (NSA), who often has much more than terrorism on his mind. Intelligence operations within the country are carried out by the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and its wide network of officers and men, all reporting to the Ministry of Home Affairs. The ministry is headed by a cabinet minister and one or two ministers of state—besides a secretary and other senior officials—who often get tempted, at least close to the elections, to utilize the IB for assessing the electoral chances of their party while spying on their rivals. EM Rammohan, a former member of the National Security Advisory Board, notes: “Instead of concentrating on security issues, they are busy chasing the Opposition so that the ruling party is kept in power. Is that the job of the IB?” (outlookindia.com, July 31, 2006).
External intelligence is the responsibility of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), working directly under the Cabinet Secretary but reporting to the NSA for all practical purposes. RAW keeps a sharp eye on the activities of terrorist groups with bases in foreign countries. According to former IB joint-director Maloy Krishna Dhar, RAW’s reluctance to share information with IB is legendary (Rediff.com, August 17, 2006). There have also been instances where personality clashes have deterred effective coordination between the NSA and RAW chiefs [2].
The second set of intelligence agencies are the military ones, led by the Directorate General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) with a network of field offices and forward posts in the border areas as well as representatives in diplomatic missions. Since the DGMI has been historically part of the Army, the Air Force and Navy have individual intelligence units collecting and collating information relevant to their operations and bases. The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), created in 2002 to correct this anomaly, is entrusted with the task of coordinating the whole spectrum of military intelligence but is presently short-staffed, poorly funded and burdened with an ambitious and expanding circle of objectives [3].
Paramilitary organizations like the Central Reserve Police Force and Border Security Force maintain their own intelligence units to support counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir and elsewhere. Their intelligence operations have often been stymied by the Army's reluctance to share intelligence tapped from its wide network of informers and sources. Other government agencies providing physical security, like the Special Protection Group, Central Industrial Security Force and National Security Guards, all maintain their own intelligence units.
At the bottom of the pyramid are the state police, whose intelligence networks remain the primary source of information and main agency for implementing action on the ground. The most critical element in this structure is the investigative branch of the local police forces. These go by various names, such as the Criminal Investigation Department, the Special Branch or the Crime Branch. There is no uniformity in responsibilities or operational duties. Typically these units carry out the investigation and prosecution of terrorist, hawala, arms and counterfeit cases, placing them in the unique position of being able to detect the emergence of terror networks or coalitions.
Unfortunately they remain the weakest link in the intelligence chain as these units carry the burden of acting as colonial-style law enforcement agencies and not as modern units capable of organizing preventive measures based on intelligence collection. These forces are commonly afflicted with poor morale and problems related to accountability, pay and training. Even in metropolitan centers like Delhi and Mumbai, the police-criminal nexus and pervasive corruption have rendered effective intelligence from federal agencies worthless. There was clear intelligence available about terrorist attacks in Mumbai at least a month before the July 2006 commuter train blasts. This intelligence was not followed up on, nor were preventive measures put in place at railway stations. A week after the Mumbai blasts, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was quoted by the media as saying that “past responses have been inadequate in dealing with these problems which are of a different intensity, magnitude, scale and scope” (The Tribune [Chandigarh, Punjab], July 21, 2006).
Reforming the Intelligence Structure
Of the several steps taken in recent years to overcome these outstanding difficulties, two held great promise. One was the creation of the National Technical Research Organization (NTRO), with a focus on collecting technical intelligence (TECHINT), cyber intelligence and cyber counter-intelligence [4]. Beginning with RAW's Aviation Research Centre (ARC) assets, NTRO is rapidly expanding and strengthening its intelligence capabilities to fulfill this mandate. On the other hand, the NTRO mandate adds one more agency to the mix, as the IB, RAW and the Army’s Signals Directorate will continue to maintain autonomous TECHINT units.
The second step was the establishment of a Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and a Joint Task Force on Intelligence within IB as a hub of India's counter-terrorism effort. The mission objective was to run an umbrella organization comprising state-level units called SMACs and the development of a national counter-terrorism database supported by state-level police-intelligence Joint Task Forces and inter-state Intelligence Support Teams (The Hindu, February 12). Conceived after the pattern of the CIA's Counter-Terrorism Center, the MAC was to be responsible for the joint analysis of intelligence flowing from different quarters and coordinating relevant follow-up actions (Rediff.com, April 6, 2003).
Five years after MAC was approved, it is today composed of a skeletal staff and five SMACs, using a database hosted on a bare-bones computer system designed in-house, with no real-time links to state police forces or other intelligence agencies. There is no sign of the development of the comprehensive database on terrorists on which the entire counter-terrorism information grid was to be built. Senior intelligence officials have pointed out that the interrogation reports of 16,000 Islamist terrorists caught between 1991 and 2005 could prove to be a goldmine of actionable intelligence (The Hindu, February 6). These inadequacies can be overcome by beefing up the present staff strength and widening the recruitment base to include the qualified technical personnel needed to develop, integrate and man the information grid. But progress is delayed due to unseemly bureaucratic wrangling over funding for an additional 140 positions at MAC. Added to this problem is the Indian Army's refusal to depute officials to the agency, citing disciplinary and administrative problems (The Hindu, February 12).
Conclusion
Difficulties like these and the tepid response of the state governments to a 2007 Supreme Court directive ordering improvements in the functioning of police and intelligence agencies continue to bedevil India’s attempts to fashion an effective counter-terrorism strategy. Meanwhile terrorist groups continue to display a marked advantage in adapting to newer technologies and modes of operation, allowing them to function more quickly and quietly than the Indian intelligence community.
What has complicated the Indian intelligence agencies’ task since the flowering of al-Qaeda and a global jihadist movement after 9/11 is the alacrity with which various terrorist groups and their support structures have reworked their strategy and operational methods to effectively dodge a series of worldwide bans. The most dramatic change in the Indian context has been the realignment of terrorist forces, with prominent groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)—proscribed by the United States and other countries, including Pakistan—stepping back to allow Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami (HuJI), an al-Qaeda ally with a pan-South Asian presence, to lead the terror campaign in India (Rediff.com, May 25, 2007).
Other changes have been noticed in the structure and modus operandi of India’s terrorist groups. The new recruits to the cause are local men: young, educated and without previous involvement in extremist activities. These men form the nucleus of groups throughout India who tap into the local criminal-hawala network of couriers and handlers to move money and explosives—often locally acquired—to carry out terrorist strikes [1]. The group carrying out the operation typically disengages and disappears after striking, leaving hardly any trace of its existence. Since the simultaneous explosions in Delhi in 2005, investigating agencies frequently encounter red herrings left by the terrorists to confuse the investigation and allow greater time to disband and escape.
Changing Circumstances
Two critical aspects in the growth of Indian terrorism are the mounting evidence pointing to the involvement of the HuJI in terror attacks and the alliance of this group with the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), a banned network of young Muslim activists who openly claim Osama bin Laden as their idol (The Hindu, April 3, 2007). For a long time India’s federal and state investigating agencies did not see the link as a serious development, continuing instead to rely on past experience by focusing on LeT and JeM activists.
One of the primary reasons for this poor assessment was the inability of the intelligence agencies and the whole cornucopia of coordinating agencies at state and federal levels to think beyond the entrenched “conventional wisdom” of analyzing terrorist groups through ideological prisms, thereby completely missing the possibility that these groups might work together for a common goal. This has happened not only in India but even in Pakistan, where one such coalition of terror groups called Brigade 313 was involved in assassination attempts on President Pervez Musharraf (Newsline, August 2004; Asia Times, July 14, 2004).
Equally restricting has been the reluctance, and even refusal, to share information among the intelligence and security agencies. Along with an inept information-sharing architecture at the national level, this reluctance has proved to be the most critical flaw in counter-terrorism intelligence operations (The Hindu, October 30, 2001). The problem came to the fore recently when police in the Karnataka state of southern India arrested one Riyazuddin Nasir on charges of vehicle theft. Nasir would have been let out on bail for these minor charges but for a single intelligence official in Delhi who decided to search the database for connections with terrorist activities. Nasir was found to be a HuJI operative and one of India's most wanted men (The Hindu, February 12).
Failure to Cooperate
It is not really difficult to see where the problem is—an intelligence structure which has yet to emerge from its debilitating colonial legacy and a complementary stranglehold of bureaucracy. The structure and operational philosophy of state police and intelligence units have not changed much since British days—they are mostly structured as agencies to protect law and order and spy on rivals rather than act as investigative and intelligence units. Criminal investigators are usually inserted into terrorism investigations only after an incident takes place. There are no independent anti-terror units carrying out both intelligence and investigations into terrorist groups at the state level.
At the top of the intelligence pyramid is the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), headed by an all-powerful, politically-appointed National Security Advisor (NSA), who often has much more than terrorism on his mind. Intelligence operations within the country are carried out by the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and its wide network of officers and men, all reporting to the Ministry of Home Affairs. The ministry is headed by a cabinet minister and one or two ministers of state—besides a secretary and other senior officials—who often get tempted, at least close to the elections, to utilize the IB for assessing the electoral chances of their party while spying on their rivals. EM Rammohan, a former member of the National Security Advisory Board, notes: “Instead of concentrating on security issues, they are busy chasing the Opposition so that the ruling party is kept in power. Is that the job of the IB?” (outlookindia.com, July 31, 2006).
External intelligence is the responsibility of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), working directly under the Cabinet Secretary but reporting to the NSA for all practical purposes. RAW keeps a sharp eye on the activities of terrorist groups with bases in foreign countries. According to former IB joint-director Maloy Krishna Dhar, RAW’s reluctance to share information with IB is legendary (Rediff.com, August 17, 2006). There have also been instances where personality clashes have deterred effective coordination between the NSA and RAW chiefs [2].
The second set of intelligence agencies are the military ones, led by the Directorate General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) with a network of field offices and forward posts in the border areas as well as representatives in diplomatic missions. Since the DGMI has been historically part of the Army, the Air Force and Navy have individual intelligence units collecting and collating information relevant to their operations and bases. The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), created in 2002 to correct this anomaly, is entrusted with the task of coordinating the whole spectrum of military intelligence but is presently short-staffed, poorly funded and burdened with an ambitious and expanding circle of objectives [3].
Paramilitary organizations like the Central Reserve Police Force and Border Security Force maintain their own intelligence units to support counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir and elsewhere. Their intelligence operations have often been stymied by the Army's reluctance to share intelligence tapped from its wide network of informers and sources. Other government agencies providing physical security, like the Special Protection Group, Central Industrial Security Force and National Security Guards, all maintain their own intelligence units.
At the bottom of the pyramid are the state police, whose intelligence networks remain the primary source of information and main agency for implementing action on the ground. The most critical element in this structure is the investigative branch of the local police forces. These go by various names, such as the Criminal Investigation Department, the Special Branch or the Crime Branch. There is no uniformity in responsibilities or operational duties. Typically these units carry out the investigation and prosecution of terrorist, hawala, arms and counterfeit cases, placing them in the unique position of being able to detect the emergence of terror networks or coalitions.
Unfortunately they remain the weakest link in the intelligence chain as these units carry the burden of acting as colonial-style law enforcement agencies and not as modern units capable of organizing preventive measures based on intelligence collection. These forces are commonly afflicted with poor morale and problems related to accountability, pay and training. Even in metropolitan centers like Delhi and Mumbai, the police-criminal nexus and pervasive corruption have rendered effective intelligence from federal agencies worthless. There was clear intelligence available about terrorist attacks in Mumbai at least a month before the July 2006 commuter train blasts. This intelligence was not followed up on, nor were preventive measures put in place at railway stations. A week after the Mumbai blasts, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was quoted by the media as saying that “past responses have been inadequate in dealing with these problems which are of a different intensity, magnitude, scale and scope” (The Tribune [Chandigarh, Punjab], July 21, 2006).
Reforming the Intelligence Structure
Of the several steps taken in recent years to overcome these outstanding difficulties, two held great promise. One was the creation of the National Technical Research Organization (NTRO), with a focus on collecting technical intelligence (TECHINT), cyber intelligence and cyber counter-intelligence [4]. Beginning with RAW's Aviation Research Centre (ARC) assets, NTRO is rapidly expanding and strengthening its intelligence capabilities to fulfill this mandate. On the other hand, the NTRO mandate adds one more agency to the mix, as the IB, RAW and the Army’s Signals Directorate will continue to maintain autonomous TECHINT units.
The second step was the establishment of a Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and a Joint Task Force on Intelligence within IB as a hub of India's counter-terrorism effort. The mission objective was to run an umbrella organization comprising state-level units called SMACs and the development of a national counter-terrorism database supported by state-level police-intelligence Joint Task Forces and inter-state Intelligence Support Teams (The Hindu, February 12). Conceived after the pattern of the CIA's Counter-Terrorism Center, the MAC was to be responsible for the joint analysis of intelligence flowing from different quarters and coordinating relevant follow-up actions (Rediff.com, April 6, 2003).
Five years after MAC was approved, it is today composed of a skeletal staff and five SMACs, using a database hosted on a bare-bones computer system designed in-house, with no real-time links to state police forces or other intelligence agencies. There is no sign of the development of the comprehensive database on terrorists on which the entire counter-terrorism information grid was to be built. Senior intelligence officials have pointed out that the interrogation reports of 16,000 Islamist terrorists caught between 1991 and 2005 could prove to be a goldmine of actionable intelligence (The Hindu, February 6). These inadequacies can be overcome by beefing up the present staff strength and widening the recruitment base to include the qualified technical personnel needed to develop, integrate and man the information grid. But progress is delayed due to unseemly bureaucratic wrangling over funding for an additional 140 positions at MAC. Added to this problem is the Indian Army's refusal to depute officials to the agency, citing disciplinary and administrative problems (The Hindu, February 12).
Conclusion
Difficulties like these and the tepid response of the state governments to a 2007 Supreme Court directive ordering improvements in the functioning of police and intelligence agencies continue to bedevil India’s attempts to fashion an effective counter-terrorism strategy. Meanwhile terrorist groups continue to display a marked advantage in adapting to newer technologies and modes of operation, allowing them to function more quickly and quietly than the Indian intelligence community.
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